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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an explanation for the run-up of U.S. inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the
sharp disinflation in the early 1980s, which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in
addressing. I present a model in which rational policymakers learn about the behavior of the
economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally, conditional on their current beliefs. The
steady state associated with the self-confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low
inflation. However, prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur
when policymakers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of
inflation in the Phillips curve. I estimate the model using likelihood methods. The estimation results
show  that  the  model  accounts  remarkably  well  for  the  evolution  of  policymakers’  beliefs,
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This paper aims to explain the behavior of inﬂation and unemployment in the United States.
Figure 1 presents a plot of the annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deﬂator and the
total civilian unemployment rate over the postwar period. The striking feature of the graph
is the long and pronounced run-up of inﬂation, which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. This
episode, known as the Great Inﬂation, is not just “America’s only peacetime inﬂation” (DeLong
1997), but has also been called “the greatest failure of American macroeconomic policy in the
postwar period” (Mayer 1999).
At least four stylized facts characterize the Great Inﬂation.
• Dimension. Between 1963 and 1981 the inﬂation rate in the United States rose by more
than 9 percentage points. If we exclude the peak in 1974 (which is due to the eﬀect of the
ﬁrst oil price shock), the rate of increase was approximately constant.
• Duration.T h ee p i s o d eo fh i g h i n ﬂation lasted for more than 20 years. Inﬂation started
to increase around 1963 and came back under control, at a level of about 2 percent, only
around 1985.
• Asymmetry. The episode of high inﬂation was asymmetric. In the early 1980s, the du-
ration of the so called “Volcker disinﬂation” was much shorter than the phase of rising
inﬂation.
• Unemployment lagged inﬂation. Unemployment lagging behind inﬂation is a general char-
acteristic of the business cycle. However, this feature of the data was particularly evident
in the period of high inﬂation, with unemployment peaking always a few quarters after
inﬂation.
This paper puts forward a theory of the behavior of inﬂation and unemployment, which ﬁts
the U.S. data well and, in particular, explains all four of the stylized facts above. This theory
is based on the evolution of policymakers’ beliefs about the structure of the economy.
Previous attempts to explain the Great Inﬂation fall apart in three categories, which I label
the “bad luck,” the “lack of commitment” and the “policy mistakes” views. I brieﬂyd i s c u s s
each of these branches of literature below.
The “bad luck” view The ﬁrst type of explanations is based on bad luck, in view of the
fact that it has been well documented that the volatility of the exogenous, non-policy shocks
2was higher in the 1960s and 1970s than in the last two decades of the century (see, for instance,
Cogley and Sargent 2003, Kim and Nelson 1999a, McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000, Sims and
Zha 2004, Stock and Watson 2002). However, although non-policy shocks deﬁnitely played an
important role, it is hard to reconcile the existing estimates with the exceptional dimension and
duration of the Great Inﬂation.
The “lack of commitment” view The second class of explanations is what Christiano
and Fitzgerald (2003) have called the “institution vision of inﬂation”. According to this view,
inﬂation was high in the 1960s and 1970s because policymakers did not have any incentive to
keep inﬂation low. The motivation for this relies on the time-consistency problem of optimal
policy, ﬁrst emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). The
importance of this line of research has been recently emphasized by Chari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum (1998), Christiano and Gust (2000) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).
However, the inﬂation bias generated by the time-consistency problem seems to be quantita-
tively too small to explain the high inﬂation of the 1960s and 1970s (see, for example, Reis 2003).
Ireland (1999) formally tests the inﬂation bias hypothesis on U.S. data. While he is not able to
reject it, his estimates suggest the presence of an inﬂationary bias of small magnitude. Moreover,
it is hard to reconcile the time-consistency view with the rapid Volcker disinﬂation. In fact, it
is not clear what exactly changed between the pre and post 1980s period from the institutional
point of view.1 The ﬁnal diﬃculty with the “lack of commitment” approach is the fact that it
would predict unemployment leading, rather than lagging inﬂation. This is due to the fact that
the advantages of inﬂationary surprises depend on the level of unemployment. As mentioned
above, this is clearly at odds with the data.
The “policy mistakes” view This approach focuses on policy mistakes and stresses that
in the 1960s and 1970s monetary policymakers were not as good as the ones of the last two
decades. For example, many authors have argued that U.S. monetary policy was less responsive
to inﬂationary pressures under the Fed chairmanship of Arthur Burns than under Paul Volcker
and Alan Greenspan (among others, see Boivin and Giannoni 2002, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
1 Recent work has made some progress in this direction. Sargent (1999), for example, explains the disinﬂation
as escape dynamycs from the inﬂation biased equilibrium. Rogoﬀ (2003) argues that Central Banks’ lower
incentive to inﬂate is related to globalization and the consequent increase in world competition. Albanesi, Chari,
and Christiano (2003), instead, analyze the lack of commitment problem in an optimizing agents model and show
the existence of multiple equilibria, which can potentially explain the disinﬂation.
32000, Cogley and Sargent 2001, Judd and Rudebusch 1998, Lubik and Schorfheide 2004).2
In this respect, the line of research started by Orphanides represents an attempt to ra-
tionalize why the policy authorities behaved so diﬀerently in the pre and post 1980s period.
Orphanides (2000 and 2002) has argued that policymakers in the 1970s overlooked a break in
potential output. They overestimated potential output leading to overexpansionary policies,
w h i c hu l t i m a t e l yr e s u l t e di nh i g hi n ﬂation. Among others, this explanation has also been pro-
posed by Cukierman and Lippi (2002), Lansing (2002), Bullard and Eusepi (2003), Reis (2003)
and Tambalotti (2003). While this strand of literature represents a step forward, the dimension
of the high inﬂation episodes explained by such models is usually much lower than what we
observe in the data, unless the model is augmented with additional propagation mechanisms
like, for instance, private sector learning (as in Orphanides and Williams 2003). Furthermore,
the explanations based on the misperception of potential output fail to address the Volcker dis-
inﬂation, unless an exogenous shift in policymakers’ preferences is speciﬁed (see, for instance,
Bullard and Eusepi 2003).
While there is clearly some truth in all of these theories, they also seem to have diﬃculties
in addressing at least some of the stylized facts of the hump-shaped behavior of inﬂation and
unemployment. This paper proposes instead an explanation of the Great Inﬂation that matches
all these stylized facts.
I present a model, in which rational policymakers form their beliefs about the behavior of the
economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally, conditional on the information avail-
able to them. Although the equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inﬂation, episodes
of high inﬂation and unemployment can occur when policymakers simultaneously underestimate
both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve. Such
initial conditions result in peculiar dynamics of policymakers’ beliefs, ultimately aﬀecting also
their perception of the slope of the Phillips curve and of the cost of the inﬂation-unemployment
trade-oﬀ.
Intuitively, if real-time policymakers underestimate the natural rate of unemployment, this
results in overexpansionary policies and higher inﬂation. Moreover, if policymakers’ estimate
of the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve is also downward biased, they rationally
choose not to react strongly to inﬂation, amplifying the initial eﬀect. The reason is that the
2 This view is controversial. Other studies have in fact found either little evidence of changes in the systematic
part of monetary policy (for example, Bernanke and Mihov 1998, Hanson 2003, Leeper and Zha 2002, Primiceri
2005) or no evidence of unidirectional drifts in policy toward a more active behavior (Sims 2001b, Sims and Zha
2004).
4more stationary inﬂation is perceived to be, the sooner it is expected to revert to its mean and
the less urgent is the need for anti-inﬂationary action. This period of “overoptimism” ends
when inﬂation reaches a level that concerns policymakers. However, when policymakers start
reacting to inﬂation, pushing unemployment above the perceived natural rate does not seem
to reduce inﬂation. This is because they still have a downward biased estimate of the natural
rate of unemployment. In this period of “overpessimism”, they temporarily and mistakenly
perceive a very costly inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ, which explains why anti-inﬂationary
policy is postponed even further. The disinﬂation occurs only when the perceived inﬂation-
unemployment trade-oﬀ becomes favorable, relative to the level of inﬂation.
Among others, Orphanides (2000), DeLong (1997) and Romer and Romer (2002) have argued
in favor of the policy misperception of potential output and the natural rate of unemployment in
the 1960s and 1970s. Policymakers’ misperception of the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips
curve in the 1960s is also no longer controversial. For example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989)
and Mayer (1999) have noted that, at least until the early 1970s, most of the econometric
studies underestimated inﬂation persistence. In relation to the overpessimism phase, DeLong
(1997), Romer and Romer (2002) and Cogley and Sargent (2004) have emphasized that policy
was cautious in the 1970s because the cost of lowering inﬂa t i o ns e e m e dt o oh i g h .
From a quantitative and statistical standpoint, I show that the evolution of policymakers’
beliefs about the coeﬃcients of the Phillips curve is very important to explain the behavior of
inﬂation and unemployment. I estimate the model using likelihood methods. The estimated
version of the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policymakers’ beliefs, stabi-
lization policy and the postwar behavior of inﬂation and unemployment in the United States.
The importance of policymakers’ learning dynamics has been recognized by many authors.
In the context of the “natural rate” literature, policymakers’ learning has been introduced by
Sims (1988). Theoretical advances include Sargent (1999), Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002)
and Williams (2003). Empirical studies include Chung (1990), Sargent (1999), Cogley and
Sargent (2004) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004). The main insight of this literature
is that policymakers’ learning introduces temporary deviations from the model’s equilibrium,
which is characterized by an inﬂation bias. These temporary deviations are in the direction of
the optimal, low inﬂation outcome. Unlike these studies, in this paper the equilibrium outcome
is a low inﬂation regime. Nevertheless, the model explains the run-up of U.S. inﬂation in
the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinﬂation in the early 1980s. Although the explanation
roughly belongs to the “policy mistakes” category, in this paper policymakers are assumed to be
5rational and optimizing. As a consequence, I ﬁnd that the mismeasurement of the natural rate
of unemployment alone is not suﬃcient to generate ﬂuctuations of the inﬂation rate comparable
to what we observe in the data. This diﬀers importantly from Orphanides (2000) and other
similar approaches.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of the economy
and policymakers’ behavior. Section 3 oﬀers a model-based interpretation of the Great Inﬂation.
Section 4 focuses instead on statistical evidence, i.e. estimation, ﬁt and quantitative simulation
results. Sections 5 and 6 demonstrate the robustness of the results to two modiﬁcations of the
baseline framework. In particular, section 5 introduces private agents’ forward looking behavior
in the model and section 6 allows for stochastic volatility of the exogenous innovations. Section
7 makes an attempt to uncover the deeper reasons of the Great Inﬂation, i.e. why policymakers
underestimated the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve in the 1960s. Section 8 concludes
with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Imperfect Information and Inﬂation-Unemployment Dynam-
ics
In this section I present a simple model of inﬂation-unemployment dynamics when policymakers
have imperfect information. The source of imperfect information is the fact that policymakers
do not know the exact model of the economy. In particular, they are uncertain about the value
of the model’s parameters. Therefore, policymakers update their beliefs about the model’s
unknowns in every period and implement optimal policy, conditional on their current beliefs. In
turn, the policy variable aﬀects the behavior of inﬂation and unemployment because it enters
the model describing the true evolution of key macroeconomic variables.
2.1 The Model Economy
As a “true” model of the economy, I consider a simple rational expectations model that can be
rewritten as a backward looking one. Even if conceptually similar to modern New-Keynesian
speciﬁcations, the benchmark model is more in the spirit of the empirical literature following
along the lines of King, Stock, and Watson (1995) and, more recently, Gordon (1997 and 1998),
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997 and 2001).
This framework, not only is tractable and convenient for estimation, but is also simple and
transparent, providing a clear intuition for the role played by policymakers’ learning dynamics
6in the behavior of inﬂation and unemployment. Integrating learning dynamics in a forward
looking speciﬁcation is instead computationally more expensive and this case in analyzed in
section 5.
The private sector part of the model is described by the following equations:
πt = πe
t − ˜ θ(L)(ut−1 − uN
t−1)+εt.( 1 )
(ut − uN
t )=ρ(L)(ut−1 − uN
t−1)+Vt−1 + ηt,( 2 )
uN
t =( 1 − γ)u∗ + γuN
t−1 + τt.( 3 )
Equation (1) represents a standard expectation augmented Phillips curve, where πt is the in-
ﬂation rate, πe
t is the agents’ expected inﬂation rate, ut is the unemployment rate and uN
t is
the time varying natural rate of unemployment. ˜ θ(L) is a lag polynomial and εt is a random
innovation, assumed to be i.i.d. N(0,σ2
ε).3 I assume that some of the agents are fully rational,
while the rest of them form their expectations adaptively, so that
πe
t =( 1− ˜ α(1))Et−1πt +˜ α(L)πt−1.( 4 )
˜ α(L) is a lag polynomial and the combination of (1) and (4) leads to the following familiar
reduced form Phillips curve:
πt = α(L)πt−1 − θ(L)(ut−1 − uN
t−1)+εt,( 5 )
where α(L)=˜ α(L)/˜ α(1) and θ(L)=˜ θ(L)/˜ α(1). Note that, no matter what the exact fraction
of agents with adaptive expectations is, α(1) = 1, implying the absence of a long run trade-oﬀ
between unemployment and inﬂation, which is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis. The
interpretation of (5) is straightforward: the inﬂation rate changes either because of a random
“cost push” term or because unemployment is not in line with the natural rate.
Equation (2) is a very simple aggregate demand equation, where ρ(L) is a lag polynomial,
ηt is an i.i.d. N(0,σ2
η) random innovation and Vt is a variable controlled by policymakers. In
other words, unemployment deviates from the natural rate either because of a random shock or
because of policymakers’ decisions about stabilization policy.
Although a natural interpretation of the policy variable Vt is of real rate of interest, more
generally Vt can be thought as capturing the joint eﬀect of monetary and ﬁscal policy. In
particular, this modeling strategy avoids complications related to the speciﬁcation of two aspects
3 The case of heteroskedastic innovations is particularly interesting in the context of learning models and is
analyzed in section 6.
7o ft h ep o l i c yp r o c e s s :t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h em o n e t a r ya n dﬁscal policy actions on real
activity and the particular channels through which monetary and ﬁscal policy aﬀect real activity.
This is in the spirit of the recent renovated interest on the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy (see, among
others, Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Mountford and Uhlig 2002) and the direct role of monetary
aggregates in macro models (Favara and Giordani 2002, Leeper and Roush 2003).
Equation (3) describes the exogenous stochastic process for the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, which is assumed to evolve as an AR(1), where τt is i.i.d. N(0,σ2
τ). u∗ represents the
unconditional expectation of uN
t . This assumption on the evolution of uN
t is standard in the
literature (see, for instance, Staiger, Stock, and Watson 2001, although they set γ =1in their
empirical speciﬁcation).
2.2 Optimal Policy under Imperfect Information
The value of the policy variable V is chosen in every period by policymakers. They base their
decision on the available information and on current beliefs about the state of the economy.
I assume that policymakers know the structure of the true model of the economy (given by
equations (5) and (2)), but they are uncertain about the value of the unobservable variables
(the natural rate) and the coeﬃcients. Policymakers estimate the model’s parameters in every
period and use these estimates as true values, neglecting both estimates uncertainty and the
possibility of future updates.4
Policymakers’ beliefs about unobservables and the model’s constant coeﬃcients are denoted
by hats. All these beliefs are formed at time t, but the subscript is omitted for simplicity. In
particular, ˆ uN
t−1 stands for ˆ uN
t−1|t and indicates the estimate at time t of the value of the natural
rate at time t−1. Policymakers determine the optimal value of the policy variable V by solving
the following optimization problem:
min
{Vt}








ut − kˆ uN
t
¢2




s.t. πt =ˆ cπ +ˆ α(L)πt−1 − ˆ θ(L)(ut−1 − ˆ uN
t−1)+ˆ εt,( 7 )
(ut − ˆ uN
t )=ˆ cu +ˆ ρ(L)(ut−1 − ˆ uN
t−1)+Vt−1 +ˆ ηt.( 8 )
L represents the familiar quadratic loss function, which depends on deviations of inﬂation and
unemployment from the respective targets. λ represents the weight on the unemployment
objective. Notice that, like in Barro and Gordon (1983), the target for the unemployment
4 These assumptions are standard in the adaptive learning literature, although the resulting policymakers’
behavior is suboptimal. For alternative approaches, see Beck and Wieland (2002) and Wieland (2000a and 2000b).
8rate is given by kˆ uN
t .W h e nk =0the unemployment target is equal to zero and policymakers’
preferences resemble Kydland and Prescott’s (1977). This would be the case in which the policy
time-consistency problem is most pronounced. On the other hand, when k =1 , the target is the
natural rate and the time-consistency and the related inﬂation bias completely disappear from
the policy problem. Blinder (1998), among others, has argued in favor of these kind of policy
preferences. The loss function has also a “smoothing” component, which penalizes big shifts
of the policy variable. From an empirical perspective, this term is crucial in order to match
the actual policy behavior because it helps to account for the strong autocorrelation shown
by the instruments of economic policy (Dennis 2001, Favero and Rovelli 2003 and Soderstrom,
Soderlind, and Vredin 2003). See also Woodford (2003) for an overview of the theoretical
desirability of the smoothing term in the monetary policy context. Moreover, it is easy to
think to models in which instrument smoothing is desirable also for ﬁscal policy (for example,
Barro 1979).
Policymakers minimize their loss function subject to two constraints, (7) and (8). These
constraints are the estimated counterparts of the true Phillips curve and aggregate demand
equations. Observe that in the policymakers’ model ˆ α(1) is not constrained to be equal to one
and ˆ cπ in (7) controls their beliefs about the level of average inﬂation. ˆ cu in (8) instead controls
their beliefs about the eﬀect of setting V equal to zero. In other words, −ˆ cu represents the
“natural” level of policy, i.e. the level of V that does not aﬀect unemployment.5 Notice that,
without further assumptions, ˆ cπ, ˆ cu and ˆ uN
t would not be separately identiﬁed in the policy
econometric model. A discussion about this issue is postponed until the next subsection.
The optimal rule for ﬁxing Vt is given by
Vt = g(ˆ β)St,( 9 )
where ˆ β represents the vector of values for the model’s parameters that policymakers treat as
certainty-equivalents; g(ˆ β) is the standard solution of a linear-quadratic problem, obtained solv-
ing the corresponding Riccati equation. St m e a n w h i l ed e n o t e st h es e to fr e l e v a n ts t a t ev a r i a b l e s
and beliefs about unobservable states of the economy. To be more concrete, assuming that all the
lag polynomials have order one, ˆ β would be given by the vector
h
ˆ cπ;ˆ α1;ˆ α2;ˆ θ1;ˆ θ2;ˆ cu;ˆ ρ1;ˆ ρ2;ˆ uN
t
i
and St by the vector
£
1;πt;πt−1;ut − ˆ uN




5 In the true model the “natural” level of policy is normalized to zero.
92.3 Learning
To implement the optimal rule and ﬁx the value of the policy variable Vt,p o l i c y m a k e r sm u s t
estimate the parameters of interest, which are the unobservables and the coeﬃcients. While I
relax this assumption in Primiceri (2004), here I assume that policymakers form their beliefs
about the natural unemployment rate using univariate methods, i.e. they extract information
about the natural rate, only looking at the behavior of unemployment. Observe that this is
suboptimal as, conditional on the true model of the economy, better estimates could be obtained
by exploiting the information contained not only in the unemployment rate, but also in the
inﬂation rate. However, there are several reasons motivating this choice.
First, historical narrative evidence (see, for instance, DeLong 1997, Romer and Romer 2002)
suggests that this is a realistic assumption for the behavior of past policymakers. Even now,
univariate algorithms are commonly used to deﬁne the potential of the economy, especially in the
output gap and monetary policy literature (see, for instance, Orphanides and Van Norden 2001,
Lansing 2002, Taylor 1999). Second, Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001) show that the natural
rate estimated using formally the Phillips curve approach is basically indistinguishable from the
univariate trend in unemployment. The last reason is substantial. In fact, as mentioned above,
ˆ cπ, ˆ cu and ˆ uN
t are clearly not separately identiﬁed in equations (7) and (8). Therefore, I assume
that policymakers solve this identiﬁcation problem by imposing the prior belief that on average,
unemployment is equal to its natural rate. This assumption provides a very natural way of
estimating the natural rate, which is to use univariate algorithms on the series of unemployment,
in order to isolate the low frequency component. Furthermore, observe that this assumption
is not contradictory and respects the coherence of the policymakers’ model because, as will be
s h o w ni ns e c t i o n2 . 4a n da p p e n d i xA ,i tc o r r e s p o n dt oas e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium.
Conditional on their estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, policymakers can esti-
mate the model’s coeﬃcients using standard regression methods. Following a large part of the
most recent literature (see, among others, Sargent 1999, Williams 2003) in the baseline speciﬁca-
tion of the model I assume that policymakers update their beliefs using constant gain algorithms
(CG). These algorithms allow to update beliefs discounting the past and giving more weight to
recent data. Recent data are considered more informative possibly because of the suspicion of
drift in the parameters.
As mentioned above, the estimation works in two steps. In the ﬁrst step policymakers obtain






ut − ˆ uN
t−1|t−1
´
,( 1 0 )
RN,t = RN,t−1 + gN (1 − RN,t−1).( 1 1 )
Equation (10) states that the current estimate of the natural rate is obtained by updating the
previous estimate according to the current realization of the unemployment rate. The weight
given to the last observation depends on the gain (gN) and the inverse of the variance of the
regressor (the constant 1 in this case), which, in turn, is updated in equation (11).
In the second step, policymakers use their estimate of the natural rate to update their beliefs
about the Phillips curve and aggregate demand coeﬃcients:
ˆ β
i












,( 1 2 )






, i = {π,u},( 1 3 )
where ˆ β
π
t =[ ˆ cπ;ˆ α1;ˆ α2;ˆ θ1;ˆ θ2]0; yπ
t = πt; xπ
t =[ 1 ; πt−1;πt−2;ut−1 − ˆ uN




[ˆ cu;ˆ ρ1;ˆ ρ2]0; yu
t = ut − ˆ uN
t|t −Vt−1; xu
t =[ 1 ;ut−1− ˆ uN
t|t;ut−2 − ˆ uN
t|t]. Notice from the expressions of
the vectors xπ
t and xu
t that policymakers approximate ˆ uN
t−1|t and ˆ uN
t−2|t with their last estimate
of the current level of the natural rate, ˆ uN
t|t. Equations (12) and (13) update beliefs with a
mechanism similar to the one illustrated for equations (10) and (11).
Observe that I allow for the possibility of diﬀerent gain parameters in the algorithms for the
estimation of the natural rate and the coeﬃcients (respectively gN and g). The gain parameters
control the rate at which new information aﬀects beliefs. If g and gN were decreasing and equal
to 1
t−1, equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) would be recursive representations of ordinary least
squares estimates (if properly initialized).
As robustness checks, I also consider the cases in which policymakers form estimates of the
natural rate using a moving average and estimates of the coeﬃcients by ordinary least squares
(OLS) or discounted least squares (DLS), a weighted least square method with weight ∆t−s to
time s observation (where t is the time period of the most recent data and ∆ < 1 is a discount
factor).
2.4 Equilibrium and Steady State
As is standard in most of the recent literature on learning, I focus on the concept of self-
conﬁrming equilibria.6 In period t, policymakers form beliefs about the model’s parameters.
6 For a formal treatment of the issue, see Sargent (1999), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Williams (2003).
11Their beliefs imply an optimal value for the policy variable Vt, which, in turn, aﬀects the
stochastic data generating process and, ultimately, next periods beliefs. This deﬁnes a map from
today’s beliefs to tomorrow’s beliefs. A ﬁx e dp o i n to ft h i sm a pi sas e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium.
In other words, a self-conﬁrming equilibrium is a situation in which policymakers’ beliefs are
expected not to change with the new vintage of data. Appendix A gives a formal deﬁnition and
derives the model’s self-conﬁrming equilibrium for the baseline case in which beliefs are formed
using the CG algorithm.
Id e ﬁne the model’s steady state as the unconditional mean of the stationary stochastic
process for the vector
£
πt,u t,V t,u N
t
¤
in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Observe that, in steady
state, (5) implies ut = u∗.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,Vt =0follows from (2). Finally (9) implicitly deﬁnes
the steady state inﬂation as a function of the equilibrium beliefs.
As an example and for simplicity, consider the intuitive case of a constant natural unem-
ployment rate.7 Notice that, if k =1 , the steady state inﬂation is just the inﬂation target π∗.
In other words, if policymakers do not wish to push unemployment below the natural rate, the
outcome is the optimal one in which unemployment is at the natural level and inﬂation at the
target. If 0 ≤ k<1 instead, the steady state inﬂation will be higher. As it will be clear later,
the data favor a model with a limited amount of inﬂation bias, due to the fact that postwar
policymakers did not seem to have an excessively low unemployment target.
3 Interpreting the Great Inﬂation
In section 2 I have presented the baseline model of the paper and discussed the related technical
issues. I now introduce a simpliﬁed version of the model and use it to interpret and explain the
p o s t w a rb e h a v i o ro fi n ﬂation and unemployment in the United States. Therefore, while the rest
of the paper focuses on estimation and simulations, the objective of this section is to provide
the intuition and the main ideas necessary to interpret the quantitative results.
7 I nt h ec a s eo fac o n s t a n tn a t u r a lr a t eo fu n e m p l o yment it is easy to check that, in the self-conﬁrming







is bigger than zero equilibrium beliefs about the model’s parameters do not necessarily coincide with
the true parameters of the model, but can be arbitrarily close.
123.1 A Special Case
As an illustrative example, consider the special case of the previous model given by the following
simpliﬁed Phillips curve and aggregate demand equations:
πt = πt−1 − θ(ut−1 − uN)+εt (14)
(ut − uN)=Vt,( 1 5 )
where policymakers determine V by solving the following problem:
min
{Vt}








ut − kˆ uN¢2i
,
s.t. πt =ˆ cπ +ˆ απt−1 − ˆ θ(ut−1 − ˆ uN)+b εt,( 1 6 )
(ut − ˆ uN)=ˆ cu + Vt.
Observe that in order to obtain a closed form solution I have modiﬁed the timing of V in (15).
The set of estimated parameters is given by ˆ β =[ ˆ cπ;ˆ cu;ˆ α;ˆ θ;ˆ uN] and the states of the policy
optimization problem are collected in St =[ 1 ;πt]. The solution of the policy problem is given
by the following linear control rule:
Vt = g(ˆ β)St = −ˆ cu + A(ˆ β)+B(ˆ β)πt,( 1 7 )
where
A(ˆ β)=−(1 − k)ˆ uN +
³
1+B(ˆ β) ˆ α
ˆ θ
´¡
ˆ cπ + θ(1 − k)ˆ uN¢
ˆ θ
³


























Observe that B(ˆ β) is always positive (for positive values of ˆ α). This implies that policy reacts
to inﬂation by pushing the unemployment rate upwards. Substituting (17) into (15) and the
resulting equation into (14) we obtain the following equation for the inﬂation rate:
πt = θ
¡
uN − ˆ uN¢
− θA(ˆ β)+
³
1 − θB(ˆ β)
´
πt−1 + εt.( 1 8 )
This equation can be interpreted as a local approximation of inﬂation dynamics for given policy-
makers’ beliefs about the state of the economy. Notice that the mismeasurement of the natural
rate of unemployment shifts the mean of the inﬂation process. Instead, the strength of the
policy reaction to inﬂation aﬀects the persistence and therefore both the mean and the variance
13of the inﬂation process. In other words, the stronger policy reacts to inﬂation in the feedback
rule, the more stationary and less volatile is inﬂation. In particular, it is easy to show that B(·)
is a positive function of ˆ α (the estimated persistence) for all positive values of ˆ α and ˆ θ (the
estimated slope of the Phillips curve). This implies that the lower the estimated persistence of
inﬂation in the Phillips curve, the lower the reaction to inﬂation and, given (18), the higher the
actual persistence of the univariate, reduced form process for inﬂation.
Similar perverse dynamics can occur for wrong estimates of θ.I n f a c t , B(·) is a positive
function of ˆ θ for values of ˆ θ<
q
1
δ − ˆ α2, which corresponds to estimated set of possible values of
ˆ θ.8 This means that the lower the estimated slope of the Phillips curve, the lower the reaction
to inﬂation and, given (18), the higher the actual inﬂation persistence. That is, if policymakers
perceive a costly inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ, they will not be willing to accept higher
unemployment for a limited relief from inﬂation. Therefore, they will react to inﬂation less
strongly, ultimately leading to a less stationary inﬂation.
The extreme case of a unit root in the reduced form, univariate inﬂation process (18) occurs
if policy does not respond to inﬂation at all. For example, this can happen if the perceived slope
of the Phillips curve is zero. Figure 2 gives an idea of the shape of the function B(·).F i g u r e
2a shows B as a function of ˆ α,w h e nˆ θ is ﬁxed to three diﬀerent values. Besides the positive
slope in all cases, notice the pronounced nonlinearity of B as a function of ˆ α, especially for high
values of ˆ α. Figure 2b shows instead the opposite case in which ˆ α is ﬁxed to three diﬀerent
values and ˆ θ is allowed to change. Interestingly, the eﬀect of increasing ˆ θ on B, heavily depends
on the value of ˆ α: the higher the estimate of inﬂation persistence, the higher the eﬀect of the
estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve on the strength of the reaction to inﬂation. This will
be crucial to explain the sharpness of the disinﬂation.
It is important to realize that the case of weak policy reaction to inﬂation leads to inﬂation
close to a unit root process. This is particularly dangerous for the stability of this economy.
The reason is that if inﬂation is stationary, a mistake in the estimation of the natural rate shifts
the mean of the process. If inﬂation exhibits a unit root instead, a mistake in the estimate of
the natural rate creates a time trend in the inﬂation process.
It is easy to check that for this simple economy, the self-conﬁrming equilibrium corresponds
to ˆ β = β =
£
0;α;θ;uN¤
. It follows that the associated stationary stochastic process for the
random vector [πt,u t,V t] is a simple VAR(1), whose coeﬃcients are omitted for brevity. The





.N o t i c et h a ti fk =1the steady state inﬂation
8 Overall B(·) is a hump-shaped function of ˆ θ. See Rudebusch (2001) for an example of parameter values for
which, locally, B(·) is a negative function of ˆ θ.
14is equal to zero. If 0 ≤ k<1 instead, we have a positive inﬂation bias. For values of k close to
one, the inﬂation bias is rather small.
3.2 A Simple Story for the Great Inﬂation
The Great Inﬂation refers to the high inﬂation and unemployment episode of the 1960s, 1970s
and early 1980s (ﬁgure 1). The model of the previous section provides a useful and powerful
tool for the interpretation of this long and important episode of U.S. recent economic history.
I begin the imaginary simulation in 1960. Figure 3 plots real-time estimates of the natural
rate of unemployment, inﬂation persistence in the Phillips curve and the slope of the Phillips
curve, starting in 1960 and formed using data from 1948. These represent measures of real-
time policymakers’ beliefs aﬀecting the choice of the policy variable V .I n ﬂation persistence is
measured by the sum of coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation, i.e. ˆ α(1) in (7). The slope of the Phillips
curve is measured as the sum of coeﬃcients on unemployment deviations from the natural rate,
i.e. −ˆ θ(1) in (7). Finally, these estimates are constructed using the baseline, constant gain
learning algorithm of section 2.3, but their qualitative behavior is very robust to the alternative
speciﬁcations of the learning algorithm.
3.2.1 The period of overoptimism
To start, notice that in the ﬁrst part of the sample policymakers’ estimates of the natural rate
of unemployment were between 4 percent and 5 percent. These are low numbers, compared
to our current estimates of the level of the natural rate in the 1960s and the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e
1970s.9
This erroneous belief that the natural rate was so low led to overexpansionary monetary and
ﬁscal policies. However, while this can explain why inﬂation started rising in the early 1960s,
it is not suﬃcient to explain why rational policymakers let inﬂation increase so much and for
such a long period of time. What is key to rationalize policymakers’ behavior in the 1960s and
1970s, is realizing that they were uncertain not only about the value of the natural rate, but
also about the value of all remaining parameters of their model. In particular, observe that the
real-time estimate of inﬂation persistence (α(1)) in the early 1960s was approximately equal to
0.5 (ﬁgure 3b).10
9 For example, compare ﬁgure 3a to the model-based, smoothed estimates of the natural rate of unemployment
plotted in ﬁgure 4.
10 Remember that if the sum of coeﬃcients on past inﬂation in the Phillips curve is less than one, this implies
the existence of a long-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment.
15According to the model, a low estimate of ˆ α(1) implies a low reaction to inﬂation, due to
the wrong belief that inﬂation is rather stationary around some mean. This explains the passive
behavior of policymakers in the 1960s. I will refer to this period as the overoptimism period,
during which inﬂation was perceived as stationary, the natural rate of unemployment as low
and the optimal policy was keeping unemployment close to the estimated natural rate, without
much concern for the accelerating inﬂation.
By now, it is not controversial that policymakers’ real-time estimates of the natural rate,
inﬂation persistence and the inﬂation-unemployment long run trade-oﬀ were too optimistic in
that period (see, for example, Orphanides and Williams 2002, DeLong 1997, Mayer 1999 and
Romer and Romer 2002).
3.2.2 The period of overpessimism
Slowly something changed. In fact, as suggested by the model and conﬁrmed by ﬁgure 3b the
estimates of α(1) should be slowly revised upwards, towards the true value of one.
However, while this would imply a reinforcement of the policy reaction to inﬂation, policy
reaction remained low because of the following perverse mechanism: policymakers noticed that
pushing unemployment above the underestimated natural rate did not provide any relief from
inﬂation. As a consequence they revised toward zero their beliefs about the slope of the Phillips
curve (ˆ θ decreases in the early 1970s, as shown in ﬁgure 3c). As implied by the model, this
reduced the strength of policy reaction to inﬂation. In other words, even after the overoptimism
period, policymakers kept reacting weakly to inﬂation, this time because they perceived a very
costly inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ. Okun (1978) provides clear evidence that this was
actually the case. In fact, he surveys a number of papers written in the 1970s by important
economists and concludes that “the average estimate of the cost of 1 point reduction in the
basic inﬂation rate is 10 percent of a year’s GNP” (Okun 1978, p. 348). Another example that
the perceived sacriﬁce ratio was very high is the following statement by the Economic Report
of the President (EROP):
When inﬂation failed to respond signiﬁcantly to macroeconomic policy, a 90-day
wage and price freeze was announced on August 15, 1971; it was followed by a
period of mandatory wage and price controls. (EROP 1979, pp. 54-55.)
Commenting on the current economic conditions, the 1972 EROP further referred to a:
tendency to an unsatisfactorily high rate of inﬂation which persists over a long
16period of time and is impervious to variations in the rate of unemployment, so that
the tendency cannot be eradicated by any feasible acceptance of unemployment.
(EROP 1972, p. 113.)
Even in 1979, the EROP wrote:
We will not try to wring inﬂation out of our economic system by pursuing policies
designed to bring about a recession. Th a tc o u r s eo fa c t i o n. . .w o u l db ei n e ﬀective.
Twice in the past decade inﬂation has accelerated and a recession has followed, but
each recession brought only limited relief from inﬂation. (EROP 1979, p. 7.)
I will refer to this period as the overpessimism period, during which policy did not ﬁght
inﬂation because policymakers “did not believe it would work at an acceptable cost” (DeLong
1997, p. 264). The overpessimism period is successive to the overoptimism one and accounts
for the long duration of the hump-shaped episode.
3.2.3 The disinﬂation
In the meantime, policymakers’ estimate of inﬂation persistence in the Phillips curve had been
updated toward the true value of one. In this situation, even small changes of the policy variable
are perceived to have long-lasting consequences on the inﬂation rate. Hence, as shown in ﬁgure
2b, the model predicts that small updates of the estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve have
large eﬀects on the strength of the policy reaction. Therefore, the episode of high inﬂation ended
after a proper revision of the estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve. This happened because
of a sequence of new exogenous shocks, which caused updates of ˆ θ toward the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. When the bias of ˆ θ decreased and the perceived inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ
improved, policymakers reacted strongly to high inﬂation, because they ﬁnally had a model of
the economy that was approximately correct. Consequently, unemployment was pushed quickly
way above the estimated natural rate. The sharp disinﬂa t i o nw a st h er e s u l to ft h i sp r o m p ta n d
strong action. Policy maintained a high unemployment rate until inﬂation came back under
control. At that point unemployment slowly returned to levels close to the natural rate.
Notice that the model’s predictions match very well the stylized facts. In fact, not only is the
model able to account for the dimension and the duration of the episode, but it is also able to
explain why the disinﬂation period was shorter than the run-up period and why unemployment
increased and decreased during the 1970s and early 1980s, lagging behind inﬂation.
17I ti si m p o r t a n tt os t r e s st h a tt h i sp a p e ro ﬀers an explanation of the Volcker disinﬂation,
which is not based on a sudden change of policymakers’ preferences in the late 1970s. Here,
instead, the disinﬂation occurs when the perceived inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ becomes
favorable, relative to the level of inﬂation.
3.2.4 The cost of disinﬂation
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ed i s i n ﬂation is delayed due to the perceived high sacriﬁce ratio represents an
important diﬀerence between this paper and Sargent (1999). In Sargent (1999), policymakers
believe that policy is able to aﬀect real activity only by directly controlling inﬂation. Therefore,
when the correlation between inﬂation and unemployment approaches zero (like in the early
1970s), for Sargent’s (1999) policymakers this represents a unique opportunity to disinﬂate,
since it can be done at no cost in terms of real activity. This does not seem to correspond to
what we observe in the data.
Like this paper, also Cogley and Sargent (2004) interpret the rise and fall of inﬂation as
the result of a learning process of U.S. policimakers. However, the policymakers in their paper
consider the prescriptions of three policy models and the delayed disinﬂation is explained by
their concern for robustness. Although I do not deny that this might be an important part of
the story, here I move in another direction. In fact, I show that a perfect explanation of the
behavior of inﬂation can be obtained when policy is based simply on one model of the economy,
if only one is willing to assume that policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s regarded real activity
and not inﬂation under their control. Although they do not provide conclusive evidence, the
quotes of section (3.2.2) suggest that this might have actually been the case. Building a model
with this feature constitute one important innovation of this paper.
Another crucial diﬀerence between this paper and Cogley and Sargent (2004) (as well as
Sargent 1999 or Sargent, Williams, and Zha 2004) is the fact that, as a “true” structure of the
economy, I use a reduced form new-Keynesian model, which allows me to explain the behavior of
unemployment during the Great Inﬂation. The use of a “true” model of the economy similar to
Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1973) (together with their assumption about the public’s expectations
formation) prevents Cogley and Sargent (2004), Sargent (1999) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha
(2004) from oﬀering any explanation for the hump-shape behavior of unemployment.
184 Empirical Evidence
This section presents empirical evidence supporting the model of section 2 and the dynamics
illustrated in section 3.
I estimate the model by maximum likelihood methods, over a sample period running from
1960:I to 2002:IV, using quarterly data on inﬂation and unemployment.11 I let policymakers es-
timate the approximate model and, consequently, choose V in every period. Putting the model
in state space form, the likelihood can be computed using the Kalman ﬁlter (see appendix







while I ﬁx δ =0 .99, π∗ =2 , λ =1 , u∗ =6 , γ =0 .99, σ2
τ =0 .0199.F i x i n g δ is standard
practice. I ﬁx π∗ =2because this number is close to the estimates of the inﬂation target level
for the post-Volcker era (see, for instance, Bullard and Eusepi 2003, Schorfheide 2003, Favero
and Rovelli 2003). However, diﬀerently from these previous studies, there is no exogenous
switch in the level of the inﬂation target in my model. λ is set to 1 to be consistent with
some previous studies (for example, Sims 1988 and Sargent 1999).12 Finally, for the coef-
ﬁcients of the exogenous process driving the natural rate, u∗ =6is chosen to match the
average of unemployment during the sample period. γ is ﬁxed at 0.99 and σ2
τ at 0.0199 to
impose the prior belief that the natural rate is smoother than unemployment itself. Notice
that the value of γ and σ2
τ imply an unconditional variance of one for the natural rate. Fur-
thermore, in the case of the constant gain learning, g is set to 0.015 and gN to 0.03.O b -
serve that the constant gain for the estimation of the natural rate of unemployment is higher
than the one for the estimation of the parameters. This captures the fact that policymak-
ers expect the natural rate to drift more than the model’s coeﬃcients. I calibrate the initial
beliefs in the most natural way, that is using the actual data from 1948 to 1960.13 This pro-
cedure results in the following set of initial beliefs in 1960:
h





The point estimates and the standard errors of the free coeﬃcients are reported in table 1 for
the three speciﬁcations of the learning algorithm. Four results stand out. First, the estimates
11 As in the rest of the paper, inﬂation is measured by the annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deﬂator
and unemployment by quarterly averages of the monthly civilian unemployment rate.
12 Interestingly, if λ is treated as a free parameter in the estimation procedure, the point estimate is 0.99,w i t h
a standard error of 0.36.
13 I used the DLS algorithm with discount rate ∆ =1− 1/120.
19obtained using diﬀerent assumptions for the policymakers’ learning process are very similar to
each other. Second, the estimate of φ, the smoothing coeﬃcient in the policy loss function,
might appear as too high. However, once movements in the policy variable V are interpreted
in terms of deviations of unemployment from the natural rate, the size of φ is not a puzzle
anymore.14 Third, all the other coeﬃcients have reasonable sign and size. Fourth, the estimate
of k, the parameter that aﬀects the unemployment target in the loss function (6), is close to
unity, casting doubt on the inﬂationary bias story that I mentioned in the introduction.
Figure 4 plots the smoothed estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, which resembles
previous estimates in the literature (Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997 and 2001, Gordon, 1997).
Figure 5 plots the evolution over time of the model’s policy variable V . A measure of the
real rate of interest (rescaled)15 is reported for comparison. Notice the similarities between the
two series, especially in the second part of the sample. This is remarkable, if we consider that
t h et i m es e r i e sf o rV has been obtained without any information related to the interest rate.
4.2 Model’s ﬁt
In order to evaluate the ﬁt of the model, I compare it to the ﬁt of unrestricted multivariate
linear models, i.e. bivariate vector autoregressions (VAR) with inﬂation and unemployment,
similar to the ones used in King and Watson (1994). I consider the three alternatives of a
VAR(2), a VAR(3) and a VAR(4), where the number in parenthesis indicates the number of
lags included in the VAR. Table 2 reports three measures of ﬁt for the learning models and the
reference ones. The ﬁrst column of table 2 reports the value of the log-likelihood, evaluated
at the peak. The log-likelihood is useful, but certainly not very informative in a case in which
the candidate models have such a diﬀerent number of free parameters. A VAR(2) has 13 free
parameters, a VAR(3) has 17 and a VAR(4) has 21, as opposed to the 9 free parameters of
my model. The diﬀerence in the number of free parameters is so large that, even though the
models are non-nested, it is reasonable to expect a lower log-likelihood for the learning models
with respect to the reference ones.
To solve this problem, the second column of table 2 reports the Bayesian Information Crite-
14 For example, consider a permanent unitary increase in the level of Vt. This would create a permanent
deviation of unemployment from the natural rate equal to
1
1−ρ(1). Therefore the term φV
2
t in the loss function
could be expressed in terms of deviations of unemployment from the target as φ(1 − ρ(1))
2 
ut − ˆ u
N
t
2,w h e r e
the weight becomes φ(1 − ρ(1))
2. If unemployment is very persistent, ρ(1) will be close to one and φ(1 − ρ(1))
2
w i l lb eas m a l ln u m b e r ,d e s p i t eav e r yh i g hφ.
15 The real rate of interest is computed as federal funds rate minus the quarterly inﬂation rate averaged over
the last four quarters.
20rion (BIC). BIC is an asymptotic approximation of the marginal likelihood and automatically
penalizes models with higher number of parameters.
The third column of table 2 is in principle the most reliable measure of ﬁt. The last column
in fact reports the logarithm of the marginal likelihood itself, which, is proportional to the
posterior probability of the model, under ﬂat prior on the models’ space.16
From table 2 it is clear that, as expected, the log-likelihood of the learning models is lower
than the unrestricted alternatives. However, once the diﬀerent number of parameters is taken
into account, it seems that the learning models ﬁt the data better than the reference VARs. In
particular, the marginal likelihood favors the learning models over the alternative ones. Observe
that the results of the model comparison exercise are robust to diﬀerent policymakers’ learning
schemes.
4.3 Simulations
This subsection considers quantitative simulations of the model in the case of the benchmark
(CG) speciﬁcation. The purpose of these simulations is twofold. First, they show that the
model produces a pronounced, prolonged and asymmetric hump-shaped behavior of inﬂation
and unemployment. In addition, these simulations highlight that the mismeasurement of the
natural rate of unemployment alone is not suﬃcient to reproduce this kind of hump-shaped
behavior.
In order to do so, I conduct the following exercise. I start in 1960:I, assuming that data on
inﬂation and unemployment are the actual data from 1948:I to 1959:IV. In 1960:I, policymakers
optimize their objective function, on the base of the current estimates and ﬁxt h ev a l u eo fV
for the current period. Unemployment and inﬂation in 1960:II are determined through the true
Phillips curve and aggregate demand equations, (5) and (2). In the next period, policymakers
reestimate their approximate model and choose the new value for the policy variable. With this
mechanism I simulate 42 years of quarterly data, up to 2002. In the simulations I assume that
the true value of the model’s parameters are the values estimated in the previous subsection and
reported in the ﬁrst column of table 1. Also as “true” natural rate of unemployment I use the
smoothed estimate plotted in ﬁgure 4. Finally, I perform the simulations generating sequences
16 The marginal likelihood is computed using the Laplace method, based on a second order approximation of the
posterior around the peak. For the VAR models instead, it is possible to compute the exact marginal likelihood.
Since the computation of the marginal likelihood requires the use of a proper prior, to remain as agnostic as
possible, for the model comparison I use training sample priors. Therefore, while the original sample starts in
1960, I extend it back to 1953. The (properly rescaled) likelihood of the training sample is then interpreted as a
prior density for the original sample. Further details can be found in Sims (2002) and Sims (2003).
21of i.i.d. random innovations with mean zero and variance corresponding to the estimated value
reported in table 1.
Ip e r f o r m3,000 simulations using identical initial conditions for policymakers’ beliefs in
1960 (the ones reported in section 4), but diﬀerent series of exogenous shocks. The main results
are summarized in ﬁgure 6. Figures 6a-d graph the empirical distribution of four objects:
the maximum level reached by the inﬂation rate between 1960 and 2002 (max(π)); the time
period in which inﬂation reaches its maximum level (t∗
π); the maximum level reached by the
unemployment rate between 1960 and 2002 (max(u)); the diﬀerence (expressed in years) between
the time period in which unemployment peaks and the time period in which inﬂation peaks
(t∗
u−t∗
π). The scatter plots of ﬁgures 6e and 6f are meant to illustrate two bivariate relations: the
relation between peak time and the peak level of inﬂation; the relation between the peak level of
unemployment and inﬂation. Overall, ﬁgure 6 makes clear that the model reproduces remarkably
well the main characteristics of the Great Inﬂation. In particular, the model fully captures the
dimension, the duration of the high inﬂation episode and the fact that unemployment peaks
after inﬂation.
Showing that, on average, the simulated time paths exhibit a rapid disinﬂation is less
straightforward, because simply averaging the simulated time paths would not preserve the
typical shape. To solve this problem I compute the average path, but only after rescaling the
h o r i z o n t a la n dv e r t i c a la x i si ne v e r ys i m u l a t i o n ,t om a k et h e mp e a ka tt h es a m et i m ea n da tt h e
same level.17 The result is plotted in ﬁgure 7, where the peak time of the average inﬂation path
is normalized to zero and the peak value to the peak level of actual inﬂation in 1981. Actual
inﬂation is also reported for comparison. The striking feature of ﬁgure 7 is that the average
of the simulated paths captures perfectly the so called Volcker disinﬂation, that many macro
models have diﬃculties in addressing.
Figure 8a plots a simulation of the behavior of inﬂation and unemployment, when the
standard deviation of the shocks to the Phillips curve and the aggregate demand are chosen as
small as possible and are ﬁxed respectively to 0 and 0.005.18 This is clearly improper, since
the model is nonlinear and the size of the shocks might aﬀect the speed of the learning process.
Nevertheless, if we keep this in mind, this simulation shows that the model can capture perfectly
17 In order to determine the peak time of inﬂation in a robust way, I compute a ﬁve years moving average for
every simulated path and select the point in time in which the resulting smooth series reaches the maximum.
18 Two observations are necessary at this point. First, the standard deviation of the shocks to the aggregate
demand cannot be set to zero because some random variation in the regressors of the Phillips curve is necessary for
a meaningful learning dynamics and the convergence to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Second, the simulations
with low or zero variance shocks look all exactly the same except for the time period in which inﬂation (and, of
course, unemployment) peaks.
22well the low frequency behavior of inﬂation and unemployment, even with small exogenous
shocks. This exercise stresses further the role of initial beliefs, which play a more prominent
role than the exogenous shocks in the generation of these peculiar dynamics. This diﬀers from
Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004).
Figure 8a is also very interesting for the behavior of the simulated path of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
last part of the sample. In the 1990s, the “true” series of the natural rate of unemployment
exhibits a sharp decline (corresponding to the advent of the so called “New Economy”), which
is recognized only gradually by policymakers in the simulation. Nevertheless, since in the 1990s
policymakers have approximately learnt the true values of the long and short run slopes of the
Phillips curve, they are able to prevent inﬂation from falling to undesirably low levels. This
matches very well the actual behavior of inﬂation in the last decade.
To stress even more the importance of the misperception about the coeﬃcients of the Phillips
curve in the 1960s and 1970s, ﬁgures 8b and 8c plot the results of counterfactual simulation
exercises. Here I use the same sequence of random shocks used to generate ﬁgure 8a, but I
change some of the values of the parameters of the model. In the simulation of ﬁgure 8b I
assume that policymakers know the exact value of the slope of the Phillips curve. However
they are uncertain about the natural rate and inﬂation persistence in the Phillips curve and
they have to estimate them. It is evident that the high inﬂation episode would have lasted less
long and that the rapid disinﬂation would have disappeared. In ﬁgure 8c instead, I assume that
policymakers have the correct estimate of the parameters of the Phillips curve, except for the
natural rate, which is estimated in the usual way. It is clear that, if this had been the case,
inﬂation would have increased much less than it did. Indeed, this graph does not exhibit any
sizable low frequency behavior.
In order to shed some light on the model’s implications for the future path of inﬂation, I
performed 1,000 simulations for the next 100 years. In these simulations over the period from
2003 to 2102, policymakers’ estimates of inﬂation persistence never reach the low levels of the
1960s, which means that normal supply and demand shocks do not seem to have a major eﬀect
on policymakers’ estimates of the Phillips curve coeﬃcients when enough data are available for
the estimation. As a consequence of this, in all these forward simulations, if and when inﬂation
goes up, it remains high only for a short period of time because, diﬀerently from the Great
Inﬂation, the propagation mechanism through learning is absent.
234.4 The ﬁt of alternative explanations
As shown in the previous section, the learning model is able to reproduce remarkably well
the postwar behavior of inﬂation and unemployment in the United States. The purpose of
this section is to compare the ﬁt of the baseline learning model to the ﬁto fs o m ea l t e r n a t i v e
explanations of the Great Inﬂation.
As I mentioned in the introduction, most of the alternative theories of the Great Inﬂation
adopt an exogenous shift in the preferences of policymakers to explain the sharp disinﬂation and
t h el o wl e v e lo fi n ﬂation since the early 1980s. On the other hand, the great advantage of the
approach taken in this paper is the fact that the time variation in the conduct of stabilization
policy is fully endogenized. To address this issue and assess the importance of the exogenous
and unexplainable channels of time variation in policy, I estimate a version of the learning model
where also the parameters of the loss function are allowed to vary over time. In particular, in
this subsection, I will assume the following form for the loss function of policymakers:
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which diﬀers from (6) because three of the parameters representing the preferences of policy-
makers (k, π∗ and λ) are allowed to change over time. Following many previous studies (for
example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000), I model the time variation in k, π∗ and λ in the





1,k 1,λ 1] for t<¯ t
[π∗
2,k 2,λ 2] for t ≥ ¯ t,
where ¯ t is set to the fourth quarter of 1979.
The estimates of the model with a break in the preferences of policymakers in addition to
learning are reported in the ﬁrst column of table 4, together with the value of the log-likelihood
and the BIC.19 Notice that the parameter controlling the size of the inﬂationary bias (k)d o e s
not change between the pre and post-Volcker periods. Instead, as expected, both the target for
inﬂation and the weight on the unemployment objective seem to decrease after 1979, although
the estimates are quite imprecise. In particular, the p-values for the tests with null hypothesis
of no change in π∗ and λ are respectively 0.5 and 0.34, implying a failure to reject the null of no
change in both cases. This is conﬁrmed by the relatively small improvement in the log-likelihood
and the substantial deterioration of the BIC.
19 The marginal likelihood for this model is not computed, since a prior for the preference parameters of the
post-Volcker period cannot be obtained using a training sample prior (and, therefore, the results would not be
easily comparable to the last column of table 2).
24As a further check, I consider another alternative, which is a model without learning on the
parameters of the Phillips Curve (except for the natural rate of unemployment), but with shifts
in the policymakers’ preferences. The estimates of this model are reported in the second column
of table 4. Notice that in this case k is estimated to be zero, both in the pre and post-Volcker
periods. On the other hand, both π∗ and λ, seem to decrease in the second part of the sample.
The changes in the values of π∗ and λ before and after 1979 are even larger than in the previous
case, but they are also even less precisely estimated. In fact, the p-values for the tests with
null hypothesis of no change in π∗ and λ are respectively 0.52 and 0.5, implying again a failure
to reject the null of no change in both cases. The log-likelihood and the BIC improve over
the previous speciﬁcation, but the BIC is still inferior with respect to the BIC of the baseline
learning model.
The overall impression is that the ﬁt of the baseline model is superior to the alternatives
presented in this subsection. In other words, once policymakers are assumed to learn over time
about the structural relations of the economy, the time variation in the policy preferences seems
redundant.
5 Policymakers’ Learning and Forward Looking Agents
In the model of section 2 I used the Phillips curve (1) that can be rewritten as the backward
looking equation (5), which is similar to the one estimated by policymakers. In other words
I have assumed that policymakers have the correct model of the economy in hand, but are
uncertain about the value of the model’s parameters. This section tests the robustness of the
results to alternative popular assumptions about the price setting equation. In particular, here
I will concentrate on the case in which price setters are forward looking (for example, as in
Calvo 1983). This assumption generates a forward looking Phillips curve, in which today’s
prices and inﬂation depend on expectations of future prices and inﬂation. For symmetry and in
the spirit of the recent new-Keynesian literature, I will also assume that the aggregate demand
equation has potentially a forward looking component. To be concrete, in this subsection I will

























+ Vt−1 + ηt,( 2 0 )
25where d is the private sector’s discount factor. The ﬁrst equation is a forward looking Phillips
curve and, similarly to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), can be derived from the ﬁrms’
proﬁts maximization problem. As in Calvo (1983), ﬁrms are assumed to be able to reoptimize
and set their prices with a certain probability in every period. If they do not reoptimize,
they are assumed to set their prices with an indexation mechanism to past inﬂation. This
simple indexation rule in the price setters behavior explains the backward looking component
in (19). As pointed out in many studies, this component helps to account for the high degree
of inﬂation persistence observed in the data (see, for instance, Fuhrer and Moore 1995, Gali
and Gertler 1999, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005). Observe that (19) is a vertical
Phillips curve in the long run, implying absence of long run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
unemployment.
The second equation is a forward looking aggregate demand equation. This expression can
be derived from the household maximization problem, allowing for external habit formation, as
in Smets and Wouters (2003), when ρb + ρf =1and ρb < 0.5. Habit formation explains the
backward looking component, which helps to account for the persistence observed in the data.
In my estimation and simulations I will relax the previous equality and inequality restrictions on
ρb and ρf because those restrictions seem to be at odds with the data. Observe that the value
of V is chosen by the policymakers in every period in the same way of section 2. In other words,
policymakers estimate the backward looking model given by (7) and (8) and ﬁx V solving the
linear quadratic problem based on their current beliefs. Diﬀerently from the benchmark case,
policymakers not only are using estimated parameters instead of true ones, but they are also
using a model structure which is fundamentally diﬀerent from the true model of the economy.
In order to solve the model and possibly estimate it, we need to make assumptions on the
private sector’s expectation formation process. As in Sargent (1999), I assume that the private
sector knows exactly the way policy is made. In other words, people know that policymakers
estimate (7) and (8) and ﬁx V by solving the linear quadratic problem (6). However, there are
many possible assumptions for the way agents form their expectations on future policy. For
completeness, I analyze two alternative (and completely opposite) cases. As a starting point,
following most of the adaptive learning literature, I assume that the private sector thinks that
policymakers will not revise their estimates of (7) and (8) in the future and will continue to
implement policy based on their latest estimates of (7) and (8). For simplicity, I will denote
this behavior of the private sector as “partially rational”. As an alternative and complication
of the baseline hypothesis, I also analyze the case in which the private sector is “fully rational”
26and takes into account the fact that policymakers will revise their estimates of (7) and (8) on
the base of future data.
5.1 Partially Rational Private Agents
The solution of this ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the model is reasonably standard. In fact, under the
assumptions that the coeﬃcients g(ˆ β) in (9) remain constant in the inﬁnite future, equations
(19), (20), (9) and (3) form a linear rational expectations system of equations (RESE), which
can be solved using standard methods (like Sims 2001a). In reality the coeﬃcients g(ˆ β) change,
therefore the RESE must be solved in every period of the sample to ﬁnd the time varying data
generating process. Given a random sequence of exogenous, non-policy shocks, this method can
be used to construct simulated paths of the variables of interest. Given the actual data, this
method can be used to compute the likelihood and maximize it with respect to the model’s
parameters. I ﬁx the private sector discount factor (d)t o0.99 and maximize the likelihood with







The log-likelihood and BIC for the forward looking model are reported in table 5. Although
the data seem to favor the backward looking speciﬁcation, it is worth focusing on the estimates
of the forward looking model. The point estimates and the standard errors of the parameters
are reported in table 5.20 First notice that the point estimate of θ has the correct sign, but it is
very small. However this must be expected. The reason is that, if the private sector thinks that
the policy rule parameters will not change in the future, a higher θ would imply an immediate
enormous eﬀect on inﬂation’s expectations and, consequently on inﬂation itself. We do not
observe this in the data. The second thing to notice is that the weight on the forward looking
component of the aggregate demand equation is estimated to be zero. The statistical evidence
for this result is very strong. In fact, when I reestimate the model imposing the restriction
ρf > 0.5, the log-likelihood drops dramatically. This makes equation (20) hard to reconcile
with the household optimization behavior and supports the skepticism shown, among others,
by Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2002).
As in the previous section, I ﬁx the parameters to their estimated value and perform 3,000
simulations of the pattern of inﬂation and unemployment by generating random sequences of




π. The median peak level of inﬂation is even higher than for the
baseline model, unemployment seems to peak a bit later and there is more uncertainty related
20 As in the benchmark case, here I assumed that policymakers learn using a constant gain algorithm.
27to the peak time of inﬂation. However, overall, the summary statistics are in line with the
actual behavior of inﬂation and unemployment during the Great Inﬂation. The asymmetry of
the high inﬂation episodes generated by the forward looking model is demonstrated in ﬁgures
9a and 9b, which are constructed in the same way as ﬁgures 8a and 7.
Summarizing, the results obtained with the baseline model are very robust to the use of the
forward looking Phillips curve. We observe both inﬂation increasing and decreasing faster, as
well as unemployment peaking after inﬂation.
5.2 Fully Rational Private Agents
The solution of the model with the full rationality assumption is non-standard. The reason is
that the system given by (19), (20), (3), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13) is a nonlinear RESE,
because the coeﬃcients g(ˆ β) are nonlinear functions of the endogenous variables. To solve the
model I use numerical methods. In particular I apply the method that Fackler and Miranda
(2001) propose for a general nonlinear RESE. It consists in approximating unknown functions
(which, in our case, are the expectations Et−1πt+1 and Et−1ut+1) with projection techniques. In
other words, the response function is approximated by the function Φst−1,w h e r eΦ is a matrix
of coeﬃcients and st−1 is a collection of basis functions of the state variables. The method
consists of replacing Et−1πt+1 and Et−1ut+1 with the approximations and ﬁnding the matrix of
coeﬃcients Φ∗ that solve the RESE. The diﬃculty here is the high dimension of the problem
and of the state vector. The details of the solution method are given in appendix C.
The solution of the model can take hours, therefore estimation, though theoretically easy, is
not practical.21 For this reason I perform only a set of simulations, calibrating the model in the






are ﬁxed to the
point estimates in the model’s speciﬁcation of section 5.1; θ is ﬁxed to 0.01, which is in the range
of the values that have been used by the literature. Notice that θ is ﬁxed to be higher than
the point estimate in the previous speciﬁcation. The reason is that, under this new assumption
on the expectation formation, the private sector recognizes that policy mistakes will be slowly
corrected in the future. Consequently, observing policy mistakes today does not cause a huge
eﬀect on expected inﬂation and inﬂation itself.




π i nt h el a s tc o l u m no ft a b l e3 .O b s e r v et h a ti n ﬂation and unemployment
continue to peak at high levels, which are comparable to what we observe in the data. However,
21 Since it would require several likelihood evaluation and, therefore, several model’s solutions for diﬀerent
values of the parameters.
28on average, inﬂation peaks earlier and diﬀerence between the peak time of unemployment and
inﬂation is higher than in the simulations with the other models. This is conﬁrmed by ﬁgure 9c
and 9d.
Generally, two points stand out from the analysis of table 3 and ﬁgures 9c and 9d: ﬁrst,
the simulations of this model continue to exhibit the pronounced and prolonged hump-shape
behavior of inﬂation and unemployment; second, the typical simulated path of inﬂation peaks
earlier and does not show a disinﬂation as sharp as the one observed in the data and reproduced
by the baseline model and the forward looking model of section 5.1. However, this is not at
all surprising, since the private sector is assumed to be forward looking and to take fully into
account future policy changes. If the private sector knows the way policy is made, it will predict
that policy will become very active against inﬂa t i o na ss o o na sp o l i c y m a k e r s ’e s t i m a t e so ft h e
Phillips curve will be revised. Inﬂation expectations will be automatically adjusted to take this
into account. Consequently, inﬂation will reﬂect these adjustments in expected inﬂation.
This section suggests two conclusions. First, that even in the forward looking Phillips curve
case, introducing policymakers’ learning is important to explain the dimension and duration
of high inﬂation episodes. Second, that the assumption of fully rational agents, who form
their expectations taking into account the future evolution of policymakers’ beliefs about the
economy, is probably too strong and at odds with the data on the disinﬂation episode of 1981.
6 Stochastic Volatility and the Role of Non-Policy Shocks
In this section I extend the baseline framework to account for stochastic volatility. The fact
that exogenous shocks have exhibited high heteroskedasticity over the last forty years has been
highlighted in many studies (see, for instance, Cogley and Sargent 2003, Primiceri 2005, Sims
and Zha 2004, Stock and Watson 2002, Stock and Watson 2003). Furthermore, many authors
have argued that one of the main causes of the American inﬂation in the 1970s was exactly
a particularly bad sequence of exogenous, non-policy shocks (see, for instance, Blinder 1979).
On the other hand, this paper has so far provided an explanation of the high inﬂation episode
based on the policy behavior. Therefore, it seems natural to extend and reestimate the model
of section 2 allowing for heteroskedastic innovations. In this way, I leave it up to the data
to determine whether the channel of the policymakers’ behavior remains important once the
possibility of time varying variances is taken into account.
There is also another reason why it is potentially very important to take heteroskedasticity
into account. This is because, in a learning model, the size of the exogenous shocks aﬀects
29the speed of the learning process. In very general terms, higher volatility of an equation’s
disturbances would slow down the learning process. On the other hand, higher volatility of the
regressors would speed up the learning process.
I no r d e rt oa l l o wf o rh e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t y ,Im a k e the assumption that the standard deviations
of the exogenous innovations of equations (5) and (2) follow a geometric random walk process:
logσε,t =l o g σε,t−1 + νε,t,( 2 1 )
logση,t =l o g ση,t−1 + νη,t.( 2 2 )
This class of models is known as stochastic volatility models and constitutes an alternative to
ARCH and GARCH models. The crucial diﬀerence is that the variances generated by (21) and
(22) are unobservable components.
The estimation of the model augmented with stochastic volatility is considerably more in-
volved than the benchmark case. I adopt Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for the
posterior numerical evaluation of the parameters of interest. MCMC deals eﬃciently with the
nonlinearities of the model, allowing to draw from lower dimensional and standard distributions
as opposed to the high dimensional joint posterior of the whole parameters set. Appendix D
gives the details of the estimation algorithm.
The fourth column of table 1 reports the posterior median and the posterior standard de-
viations of the parameters of interest. They are similar to the benchmark case of the previous
section. Figure 10 plots the posterior median (and the 68 percent error band) of the time
varying standard deviations of the innovations to the Phillips curve and the aggregate demand
equation. Observe that the time path is consistent with the past literature (see, for instance,
Cogley and Sargent 2003, Primiceri 2005, Sims and Zha 2004, Stock and Watson 2002). The
variance of the innovations to the Phillips curve is low in the 1960s, high in the 1970s and early
1980s and low again since 1985 to the end of the sample. The variance of the demand shocks in
the aggregate demand equation follows approximately the same time pattern. Notice the sharp
decrease in the standard deviation of the shocks to the unemployment rate that occurred in the
early 1980s, a phenomenon which is known as the Great Moderation.
I evaluate the role of the exogenous shocks in the high inﬂation episode of the 1970s by
performing counterfactual simulation exercises. The methodology I adopt is straightforward. I
ﬁx the model’s coeﬃcients to the estimated posterior medians and reconstruct an estimate of




t=1. Starting from 1960:I, these shocks can
be used to simulate counterfactual data, constructed using diﬀerent values of the parameters.
These new series can be interpreted as the realization of the data that would have been observed,
30had the parameters of the model been the ones used to generate the series. In this context,
the interesting experiment consists of replaying history assuming that the standard deviations
of the exogenous shocks were lower that the estimated standard deviations of the 1960s and
1970s. For comparison, ﬁgure 11a plots actual inﬂation and unemployment. Figure 11b plots the
counterfactual paths of inﬂation and unemployment when the time varying standard deviations
of supply and demand shocks are both replaced by their value in 1995, which is one of the
least volatile periods. It is clear that the diﬀerences from the actual behavior of inﬂation and
unemployment are minor, except, of course, for the reduced volatility. Figure 11c and 11d
plot the counterfactual paths of inﬂation and unemployment when the time varying standard
deviations of respectively supply and demand shocks are replaced by their value in 1995. Figure
11d shows that the worst scenario for inﬂation would have occurred in the case of reduced
volatility of the shocks to unemployment. The reason is that it would have slowed down the
updating process toward the self-conﬁrming value for the beliefs about the slope of the Phillips
curve parameter. For the same reason, the best scenario would have been the one of ﬁgure 11c,
i.e. the case of reduced volatility of the supply shocks and the estimated historical volatility
of the demand shocks. Finally notice that, although the behavior of inﬂation diﬀers across the
four plots, even in the most favorable scenario of ﬁgure 11c, inﬂation would still have peaked at
the high level of about 9 percent.
Overall, this section suggests two conclusions. First, allowing for heteroskedasticity of the
exogenous shocks does not undermine the results that the low frequency behavior of inﬂation
and unemployment is largely explained by the evolution of policymakers’ beliefs. Second, in
the context of this model, allowing for time varying variances does not generate important
diﬀerences in the speed of the policymakers’ learning process and the timing of the disinﬂation.
Instead, the dynamics seem to be mainly driven by the convergence process of policymakers’
beliefs to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, starting from the initial conditions. This ﬁnding also
facilitates the interpretation of ﬁgures 8a, 9a and 9c.
7W h y D i d I n ﬂation Rise?
In the previous sections I have argued that policymakers’ mistakes in the estimation of the
natural rate of unemployment can only explain why inﬂation started to increase in the early
1960s. Observe that mistakes in the estimation of the natural rate in real time are, to some
extent, unavoidable (see, for example, Orphanides and Van Norden 2001). This is because the
natural rate is intrinsically a time varying entity, due to a number of factors like demographics,
31changes in productivity growth or labor market conditions (for an overview, see Ball and Mankiw
2002).
On the other hand, the optimistic view about the natural rate is not enough to understand
why rational policymakers let inﬂation rise for more than ﬁf t e e ny e a r s .I nf a c t ,Is h o w e dt h a t
in the 1960s policymakers did not ﬁght inﬂation strongly enough because they underestimated
the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve. This induced the peculiar dynamics described
in section III.
Of course, a fundamental question is why policymakers started out with such downward
biased beliefs about the degree of inﬂation persistence in the Phillips curve (α(1)) in the 1960s?
The answer to this question is very simple and natural: because these beliefs were perfectly
consistent with the available data prior to 1960. Observe that this is true not only if we look at
data between 1948 and 1960 (like this paper does to calibrate initial beliefs), but also if we look
further back in the past. For example, Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) provide unambiguous
evidence that all data between 1900 and 1960 appeared consistent with a stable long run trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and unemployment. Similarly, Barsky (1987) uses data from 1890 to formally
show that strong inﬂation persistence emerged only around 1960. In other words, there was
basically no way for adaptive policymakers learning from the past to anticipate the high degree
of persistence of the last decades.
There are obviously many possible reasons why the properties of the inﬂation-unemployment
process might have changed so drastically in the postwar period. One conjecture is that the
diﬀerent nature of the data is related to a change in monetary regimes like, for example, the
movement away from the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods (for an overview, see Bordo 1993).
This does not necessarily imply that inﬂation rose because policymakers abandoned the com-
mitment technology provided by ﬁxed exchange rate regimes (like, for instance, in Bordo and
Kydland 1995). The interpretation provided in this paper is instead that inﬂation rose because
policymakers were simply slow to learn how to conduct policy under a new regime.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper presents a simple model of inﬂation-unemployment dynamics when policymakers
have imperfect information. The source of imperfect information is the fact that policymakers
do not know the exact model of the economy. Therefore, they update their beliefs about the
model’s unknowns in every period and implement optimal policy, conditional on their current
beliefs.
32The model’s self-conﬁrming equilibrium is characterized by low inﬂation. Nevertheless,
the model can generate prolonged and asymmetric episodes of high inﬂation, which closely
resemble the run-up of US inﬂation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinﬂa t i o ni nt h ee a r l y
1980s. In particular, these episodes occur when policymakers simultaneously underestimate
both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eP h i l l i p sc u r v e .
Starting from this situation of overoptimistic beliefs, the model endogenously generates periods
in which policy is overpessimistic. During these periods policy mistakenly perceives the inﬂation-
unemployment trade-oﬀ as too costly. I show that it is not optimal to create a recession to stop
inﬂation, either if beliefs are overoptimistic or if they are overpessimistic. This is why the policy
action against inﬂation is delayed until the moment in which the perceived trade-oﬀ improves.
When this happens, inﬂation is already very high. Therefore, the policy action against inﬂation
is strong and decisive.
Unlike most of the existing literature, the model matches many recognized stylized facts of
the American Great Inﬂation of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. I also formally estimate the model
by likelihood methods and ﬁnd that it ﬁts the behavior of US inﬂation and unemployment
remarkably well.
Given the empirical support, the model can be used to evaluate the possibility that episodes
similar to the Great Inﬂation could happen again in the future. In this respect, the conclusion
of the paper is more optimistic than alternative theories. In this model, in fact, high inﬂation
episodes do not occur as the consequence of the mismeasurement of the natural rate of unem-
ployment only (Orphanides 2000) or as a result of policymakers’ lack of commitment to low
inﬂation (for example, Sargent 1999). High inﬂation is the consequence of the unlikely combi-
nation of two factors. As mentioned above, one of these two factors is the mismeasurement of
the natural rate, which, to some extent, is unavoidable. However, the serious underestimation
of the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve seems to be much more uncommon and
appears more related to special circumstances, such as structural breaks in the true model of
the economy.
33AS e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium
Appendix A formally deﬁnes a self-conﬁrming equilibrium and derives the self-conﬁrming equi-









be the same objects deﬁned in section 2.3. I follow Sargent (1999) in deﬁning a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium in this framework:
Deﬁnition 1 As e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium is a set of policymakers’ beliefs about the models’
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=0 , i = {π,u} (24)
where the expectations are taken with respect to the probability distribution generated by (5),
(2), (3) and (9); (b) the vector
£
πt,u t,V t,u N
t
¤
is generated by the stationary stochastic process
implied by (5), (2), (3) and (9).
It is straightforward to verify that the set of beliefs ˆ uN = u∗, ˆ β
π
=[ 0 ; α1;α2;θ1;θ2] and
ˆ β
u
=[ 0 ;ρ1;ρ2] satisfy (23) and (24) and therefore represents a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, in
the case of σ2
τ =0 .W h e nσ2
τ > 0, ﬁnding the self-conﬁrming equilibrium is more involved and
requires a numerical solution of the system of equations given by (23) and (24). The procedure
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via equations (5), (2), (3) and (9). The linear process can be rewritten as a
ﬁrst order system of the form zt = C + Azt−1 + Bνt.T h u sE(zt)=( I − A)−1C and Va r(zt)
can be found by solving the Lyapunov equation Va r(zt)=AV ar(zt)A0 + BVar(νt)B0.T h e
elements of E(zt) and Va r(zt) can be used to compute E
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i = {π,u}, which, in general, will not be equal to zero. A simple equation solver can be used to




, which satisfy (23) and (24). Of course the solution
will depend on the value of the true parameters of the model. As an illustrative example I
consider the case in which the true parameters of the model are the point estimates of the
baseline speciﬁcation, presented in the ﬁrst column of table 1. The self-conﬁrming equilibrium
in this case corresponds to ˆ uN =6 , ˆ β
π
=[ 0 .0394;0.7203;0.2623;−0.8409;0.7637] and ˆ β
u
=
[0;1.5703;−0.6269]. Furthermore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the expressions contained
in (23) and (24), evaluated at the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, have negative real parts. This






increases the mistakes associated with the estimation of the current level of
the natural rate of unemployment will bias toward zero the estimate the slope of the Phillips
curve and of the persistence of unemployment deviations from the natural rate in the aggregate
demand equation. This leads to self-conﬁrming equilibria whose distance from the true values










is large with respect to
σ2
ε and σ2
η, the model does not admit a self conﬁrming equilibrium anymore. Figure 12 plots
the Euclidean distance between the true parameters ([0;α1;α2;θ1;θ2;0;ρ1;ρ2;u∗])a n dt h es e t
of beliefs about these parameters corresponding to the self-conﬁrming equilibria. These self-





≥ 0. This graph conﬁrms











larger than this value a
self conﬁrming equilibrium cannot be found. All the found self-conﬁrming equilibria are stable.
B State space form for model’s estimation
Appendix B gives the details of the state space form representation of the model for the esti-
mation with the Kalman ﬁlter.
The canonical state space form is given by:
yt = AZt + BXt + Ret,( 2 5 )





 ∼ i.i.d. N(0,I).( 2 7 )
In our case, yt =[ πt;ut]




















































The standard Kalman ﬁlter recursion formulas can be found in Hamilton (1994). To start the
recursion it is necessary to specify E (X0|Ω0) and Va r(X0|Ω0),w h e r eΩ0 represents the infor-
mation set available at time 0. Following a common practice, I set E (X0|Ω0) and Va r(X0|Ω0)
to the unconditional values implied by the transition equation. In particular, this results in
35E (X0|Ω0)=[6;6;6]
0, which corresponds approximately to the estimate of the natural rate of
unemployment of Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001) in 1960 (which is the initial date of our
sample).
C The solution method for the forward looking model
Appendix C illustrates in more detail the method used to solve the forward looking model with
fully rational agents. As mentioned in section 5.2, the model is hard to solve because it is a
nonlinear system of rational expectation equations. The source of nonlinearity is the learning
behavior of policymakers. I will rely on numerical methods. The adopted solution method is
based on Fackler and Miranda (2001). A similar method is in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio
(2002).
Consider the system of rational expectation equations given by (19) and (20). To simplify
the analysis and only for the purposes of this section I will assume that uN
t is a deterministic
function, known by the private sector, but, as usual, unknown by policymakers. I will set uN
t
to be equal to the smoothed estimate of uN
t obtained in the estimation of the forward looking
model with partially rational agents (section 5.1). Thus, let ˜ ut ≡ ut − uN
t . Equations (19) and
(20), the only ones involving expectations, can be rearranged and rewritten in the following
compact form:
yt = AEt−1yt+1 + BXt−1 + vt,( 2 8 )
where yt ≡ [πt, ˜ ut]
0 is the vector of observed endogenous variables; Xt−1 ≡ [πt−1, ˜ ut−1,V t−1]
is the vector of observed predetermined variables; vt ≡ [εt,ηt]
0 is the vector of unobservable
shocks; A and B are matrices of coeﬃcients, omitted for brevity. (28) is linear, but the complete
system, given by (28), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13) is nonlinear. The solution of the model
is the unknown response function Et−1yt+1 = Ψ(Ωt−1),w h e r eΩt represents the information
available at time t and Ψ(·) satisﬁes
Ψ(Ωt−1)=AEt−1Ψ(Ωt)+BEt−1Xt.
When the model is nonlinear in general there is not a closed form expression for Ψ(·) and it must
be approximated numerically by projection methods. The basic idea of Fackler and Miranda
(2001) is approximating Ψ(Ωt) with a linear combination of basis functions of the state variables.
This is given by Φst,w h e r est is an m × 1 vector of basis functions and Φ is a 2 × m matrix of
coeﬃcients. In the numerical procedure, also the expectation operator must be approximated
36using quadrature methods. Therefore, the expectation of a generic function f (·) of the model’s
























t + BXt + vt+1,
where the superscript j for s indicates that the value of s at time t depends on the realization of










zt−1.L e tS ≡ [s1,t−1,...,s n,t−1] be a collection of n ≥ m values of st−1 and Z ≡ [z1,t−1,...,z n,t−1]
the collection of the corresponding n values of zt−1. The solution consists in the Φ∗ which solves
Φ∗S = Z,o rΦ∗SS0 = ZS0 in the case in which n>m . It can be done using standard equation
solvers.
In this application, to approximate the integrals and expectation operators, I use a Gauss-
Hermite quadrature with 3 nodes (see Judd 1998). As mentioned above, the dimension of the
state vector is high. Thus, the use of tensor product bases or complete polynomial bases is
unfeasible for any polynomial degree bigger or equal to 2. For this reason I chose the following
ad hoc collection of 21 basis functions of the states, which turned out to work well:
st =
h




t;ˆ α1,tπt;ˆ α2,tπt−1;ˆ θ1,t
¡









Notice that the choice of st includes all linear terms in the state variables of the problem and
some potentially relevant second order terms. The dimension of st is so large that the choice of
S based on standard grid methods is unfeasible, even specifying only two values for any state
variable. To solve this problem I chose a collection of n =8 6st’s, corresponding to the actual
values of st observed in the data, every 2 quarters, from 1959:IV to 2002:IV. The results are
only marginally aﬀected by a diﬀerent choice of values for S, like for example the observed data,
every 2 quarters, 1960:I to 2002:III.
37D The MCMC algorithm for the stochastic volatility model
Appendix D illustrates the details of the MCMC algorithm used in section 6 for the estimation
of the model with stochastic volatility. The parameters of interest are the coeﬃcients Ψ1 ≡














t=1 and ση ≡ {ση,t}
T
t=1. The estimation consists of the simulation of the posterior of
the parameters of interest, conditional on the observed data. MCMC allows to simulate lower
dimensional conditional posteriors instead of the high dimensional unconditional one.
Notice that the model can be rewritten like in (25), (26) and (27), with the diﬀerence that
now the elements of R are time varying and follow the processes (21) and (22). The algorithm
works in 5 steps.
D.1 Step 1: drawing uN
Conditional on σε, ση, Ψ1 and Ψ2, the observation equation (25) is linear and has Gaussian
innovations with known variance. Therefore, the vector uN can be drawn using standard simu-
lation smoothers, like, for instance, Carter and Kohn (1994). Details of this procedure can be
also found in Kim and Nelson (1999b).
D.2 Step 2: drawing σε and ση
Consider now the system of equations
yt − AZt − BXt = y∗
t = Rtet (29)
where, taking uN, Ψ1 and Ψ2 as given, y∗
t is observable. This is a system of nonlinear measure-
ment equations, but can be easily converted in a linear one, by squaring and taking logarithms
of every element of (29), which leads to the following approximating state space form:
y∗∗
t =2 ht + e∗∗
t (30)
ht = ht−1 + ωt.( 3 1 )
y∗∗
it =l o g [ ( y∗
it)2 +¯ c]; ¯ c is an oﬀset constant (set to 0.001); e∗∗
it =l o g ( e2
it); ht =l o g ( diag(Rt)).
O b s e r v et h a tt h ee∗∗’s and the ω’s are not correlated. The system in this form has a linear,
but non-Gaussian state space form, because the innovations in the measurement equations are
distributed as a logχ2(1). In order to further transform the system in a Gaussian one, a mixture
of normals approximation of the log χ2 distribution is used, as described in Kim, Shephard,
38and Chib (1998). Observe that the variance covariance matrix of the e’s is the identity matrix.
This implies that the variance covariance matrix of the e∗∗’s is also diagonal, allowing to use the
same (independent) mixture of normals approximation for any element of e∗∗. Kim, Shephard
and Chib (1998) select a mixture of 7 normal densities with component probabilities qi,m e a n s
mi, and variances v2
i , i =1 ,...,7. The constants {qi,m i,v2
i } are chosen to match a number
of moments of the logχ2(1) distribution. The constants {qi,m i,v2
i } can be found in Kim,
Shephard, and Chib (1998).
For the innovation to the variable yjt,d e ﬁne as sT
j =[ sj1,...,s jT]0 the vector of indicator
variables selecting at every point in time which member of the mixture of normal approximation
has to be used. Conditional on uN, Ψ and sT (which denotes the collection of sT
j ), the system
has an approximate linear and Gaussian state space form. Again, exactly like in the previous
step of the sampler, this procedure allows to draw every ht using a simulation smoother.
Conditional on the data and the new series of ht’s, it is possible to sample the new sT
j vectors,
to be used in the next iteration. This is easily done (separately for every j)b ys a m p l i n gf r o m
the discrete densities deﬁned by
Pr(sjt = i | y∗∗
jt,h jt) ∝ qifN(y∗∗
jt | 2hjt + mi,v2
i ), i =1 ,...,7.
Further details can be found in Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998) or Primiceri (2005).
D.3 Step 3: drawing Ψ1
Conditional on Ψ2, σε, ση and uN,t h eo b j e c t sZt, Xt and Rt are observable. Therefore, the
elements of Ψ1 (which correspond to the elements of A and B) can be easily drawn from the
posterior of the coeﬃcients of a regression with known variance. This posterior is normally
distributed with mean equal to the OLS coeﬃcients and variance equal to the variance of the
OLS coeﬃcients.
D.4 Step 4: drawing Ψ2
Ψ2 enters the model non-linearly. Therefore, in order to draw from the conditional posterior
of Ψ2, I use a Metropolis step, nested in the Gibbs sampler. The procedure works as follows:
I draw a candidate value Ψ∗






,w h e r eΨi−1
2 is the pre-








, which, under ﬂat prior, is proportional to the value of the
39likelihood. The new draw is accepted with probability

















If the proposal value is rejected, the next element of the chain is set to be Ψi−1
2 . In order to
satisfy the constraints φ ≥ 0 and m, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, I chose the proposal distribution to be normal
in f(Ψ∗







. The mean is chosen to be f(Ψi−1
2 ), while I ﬁx
the variance to a diagonal matrix with elements 0.001 and 0.005 on the main diagonal.
D.5 Step 5: drawing Ψ3
Conditional on σε, ση, each element of Ψ3 has an inverse-Gamma posterior distribution, indepen-
dent of the other element. Conditional on σε, ση, it is easy to draw from these inverse-Gamma
posteriors because the innovations are observable.22
22 See Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995) for a description of the sampling procedure from an inverse-
Gamma or inverse-Wishart distributions.
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Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s parameters. CG: model with constant gain learning;
DLS: model with discounted least squares learning; OLS: model with ordinary least squares learning; SV: model
with stochastic volatility. Standard errors in parentheses.
47Models log-Likelihood BIC log-Marginal Likelihood
CG −250.16 −273.30 −273.66
OLS −252.02 −275.16 −268.22
DLS −248.99 −272.13 −263.68
VAR(2) −242.74 −276.17 −278.70
VAR(3) −234.52 −278.22 −279.79
VAR(4) −229.90 −283.89 −279.98
Table 2: Measures of ﬁto fd i ﬀerent models. CG: model with constant gain learning; DLS: model with discounted
least squares learning; OLS: model with ordinary least squares learning; VAR: vector autoregressions with 2, 3
of 4 lags.
































Table 3: Summary statistics of the simulations (medians, lower and upper quartiles). CG: baseline model, with
constant gain learning; FL1: forward looking model with partially rational agents; FL2: forward looking model




u stand for the time periods in which inﬂation and unemployment peak).













































































Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s parameters. SP: model with constant gain learning and
shift in the parameters representing the policy preferences; SP (no learning): model with shift in the parameters
representing the policy preferences and without learning on the persistence of inﬂation and the slope of the
Phillips curve. Standard errors in parentheses. See section 4.4 for details.
49θ ρb ρf σ2
ε σ2
η φ k log-lh BIC
−0.00095 0.936 0.0000 1.18 0.0833 1972 0.880 −307.53 −325.52
(0.00081) (0.0237) (0.0025) (0.1739) (0.0152) (1396) (0.034)
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates, log-likelihood and BIC for the forward looking model with partially
rational agents. Standard errors in parentheses.













Figure 1: US inﬂation and unemployment.




































Figure 2: Strength of the policy reaction to inﬂation as a function of (a) estimated persistence
of inﬂation in the Phillips curve and (b) estimated slope of the Phillips curve.

























Figure 3: Evolution of policymakers’ beliefs about: (a) the natural rate of unemployment; (b)
the persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve; (c) the slope of the Phillips curve.








Figure 4: Smoothed estimates of the natural rate of unemployment.














Figure 5: Models’ policy variable and real rate of interest (rescaled).











lower quartile = 10.522
upper quartile = 13.444












lower quartile = 1971
upper quartile = 1981
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Figure 6: Simulation results for the benchmark model. Empirical distribution of: (a) max(π),
(b) t∗
π,( c )max(u) and (d) t∗
u − t∗
π. Scatter plot of the relation between (e) t∗
π and max(π) and
(f) max(π) and max(u).( max(π) and t∗
π stand respectively for the peak level and the peak time
of inﬂation, while max(u) and t∗
u stand for the peak level and the peak time of unemployment).











Figure 7: Actual data and average of the simulated inﬂation paths around the peak time (time
expressed in quarters on the horizontal axis).







































Figure 8: Simulation of the inﬂation and unemployment behavior under a scenario of low
volatility of the exogenous disturbances. (a) Simulation for the baseline constant gain learning
model; (b) counterfactual simulation under the assumption that policymakers know the slope of
the Phillips curve; (c) counterfactual simulation under the assumption that policymakers know













































Figure 9: Simulation of inﬂation and unemployment under a scenario of low volatility of the
exogenous disturbances in (a) the partially rational agents model of section 5.1 and (c) the fully
rational agents model of section 5.2. Average of all simulated inﬂation paths around the peak
under realistic volatility of the exogenous disturbances in (b) the partially rational agents model
and (d) the fully rational agents model.


















Figure 10: Posterior median and 68% error bands for the time varying standard deviations of
(a) shocks to the Phillips curve and (b) shocks to the aggregate demand.
























































Figure 11: (a) Actual data for inﬂation and unemployment and counterfactual simulations when
(b) the standard deviations of the shocks to the Phillips curve and the aggregate demand are
ﬁxed to their 1995 value; (c) only the standard deviation of the shocks to the Phillips curve is
ﬁxed to its 1995 value; (d) only the standard deviation of the shocks to the aggrgate demand is
ﬁxed to its 1995 value.















Figure 12: Euclidean norm of the distance between the true value of the coeﬃcients and the
value of policymakers beliefs in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium (as a function of the variance of
the non-inﬂationary rate of unemployment).
60